Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations:
Miranda in the Lower Courts
Before Mirandav. Arizona1 a patchwork of exclusionary rules governed
the admissibility at trial of statements obtained from a suspect during custodial interrogation. The fundamental standard for review
of coerced confession cases was "voluntariness," as determined by an
examination of the "totality of circumstances" surrounding a confession. 2 This standard was supplemented by the exclusionary rules
of Massiah v. United States3 and Escobedo v. Illinois,4 and by the
1 384 US. 436 (1966). The Court's opinion covered four separate cases, Miranda v,

Arizona, Vignera v. New York, California v. Stewart, and Westover v'. United States. See
also United States v. Westover, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); State v, Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18,
401 P.2d 721 (1965): People V. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 43 Cal. Rptr. 0l, 400 P.2d 97 (1965);
People v. Vignera, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1964), aff'g without
52
opinion, 21 App. Div. 2d 7 , 252 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1964). In a later decision, Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 US. 719 (1966), the Court held that the rules established in Miranda were only
to be applied to cases tried after June 13, 1966, the date of the Court's decision in that case.
2 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963). Under the due process "totality of
circumstances" test the court considered such factors as (1) physical abuse, Lee v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); (2) threats,
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (to lode custody of children); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (of mob violence); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (to take
wife into custody); (3) extensive questioning, Gulombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)
(12V hours of questioning over 5 days); Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1950)
(6 hours of questioning over 5 days); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (23 hours
of questioning over a period of 5 days); (4) incommunicado detention, Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (incommunicado for 16 days); Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963) (incommunicado for 16 hours and refused access to wife or counsel);
Malinsky v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (not allowed to see friends); (5) denial of the
right to consult with counsel, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); (6) individual deficiencies and talents
of the accused, Columbe v, Connecticut) 367 U.S. 568 (1963) (lack of education); Spano v,
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (emotional instability); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958) (law school training); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (feeblemindedness); (7)
status of the accused, Jackson v. Denno, 378 US, 368 (1964) (sickness); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S, 293 (1963) (drugged); (8) youth, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1947). See generally, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv.
L. Rxv. 935, 961-83 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
3 377 U.S. 201 (1964). On the basis of the sixth amendment, thd Court in Massiah held
that incriminating statements extracted by federal officers from an indicted person in the
absence of previously retained counsel were inadmissible in evidence. The sixth amendment
right to counsel had previously been held binding on the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See McLeod V. Ohio, 381 U.S.

356 (1965).
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McNabb-Mallory rule against unnecessary delays prior to arraignment in federal confession cases. 5 In Miranda the Court superimposed
additional protections on the due process "voluntariness" standard
by firmly establishing the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination" as the legal justification for review of the
admissibility of a suspect's in-custody statements.7 The Court's extension of the fifth amendment privilege to police interrogation 8 an extension previously thought to be impeded by linguistic and historical barriers--signaled an attempt to restrike the pretrial balance
4 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo the majority relied on the sixth amendment to reverse
a conviction by finding that police interrogation prior to indictment was a "critical stage"
at which the right to counsel attached. The "critical stage" concept had previously been
expanded by the Court in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment) and in
White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59 (1963) (preliminary hearings).
5 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957). This exclusionary rule is embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
See FED. R. Cmr. P. 5(a). The effect of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968 on the McNabbMallory rule is unclear. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (Supp. I, 1969).
6 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
US. CoNas. amend. V. The privilege was made applicable to the states by virtue of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964),
where the Court held that state courts must employ the same standards as federal courts
in applying the fifth amendment protection. Id. at 10-11.
7 384 US. at 460-1. The Court in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), stated, in
dictum, that:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." Id. at 542.
Its decision, however, rested on the "voluntariness" test of the established "confessions
doctrine." Until Miranda both federal decisions and state authorities were in conflict as to

the constitutional basis for review of coerced confession cases. See 8 WIGMORE, EvmNcE
§ 2252 n.27 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WiGmoRE] and cases cited
therein.
8 Miranda enlarged the protection of the privilege to guard not only against "legal compulsion"--usually in the form of contempt proceedings-but also against the "informal
compulsion" inherent in custodial surroundings. 384 US. at 461. It is worth noting that
"legal compulsion" can take other forms besides contempt proceedings. In Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege barred the

use in subsequent criminal proceedings of testimony elicited from policemen at an administrative hearing by a threat of discharge. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), five
members of the Court held that disbarment is a "penalty" within the protection of the
privilege, so that an attorney named in disbarment proceedings could claim the privilege
against a subpoena ordering him to produce incriminating records without being disbarred
for his refusal to comply.

9 See 8 WiGMoRE §§ 2266, 2252. The rule giving a privilege against testimonial selfincrimination had a history, scope and development distinct from the rule excluding
coerced confessions, id. at § 2266; Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
MINN. L. REv. 1, 18 (1949), and at common law did not apply to police interrogations, 8
WiGuoRE at § 2252. Until Miranda, the privilege covered only disclosures made under

legal compulsion. Id. at § 2266. Since police have no legal authority to compel statements
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between state and accused by imposing exacting constitutional requirements for all custodial interrogations. 10
of any kind, there was no legal obligation to which a privilege in the technical sense
could apply; hence, it made little sense to say that an individual would be excused from
the legal consequences of contumacy where there were no legal consequences of contumacy. Id. § 2252 n.27. Moreover, the limitations on confessions developed under the
"totality of circumstances" test under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment were thought by many to provide an adequate constitutional framework for the
review of coerced confession cases. See id. at § 2266; 384 U.S. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting);
id. at 506, 508 (Harlan, J., joined by White and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
But the confessions doctrine as it applied to state criminal confessions cases did not
extend in all jurisdictions to exclude evidence of coerced admissions (as opposed to confessions, admitting all elements of the crime), nor did it exclude evidence of silence in the
face of accusation. 8 WiGMoRE § 2252 n.27. Although there is no legal obligation to disclose to police, before Miranda there was the danger that the police could successfully misrepresent that there was such a legal obligation. Id. at § 2252. Even in the absence of such

deception, suspects might assume that there were legal (or extra-legal) sanctions for
contumacy. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1960). Thus the linguistic
argument based on the technical meaning of the word "privilege" has been criticized as
being "casuistic," Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention,
and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 674 (1966) and "a quibble," McNaughton, The Privilege
Against Self Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affection, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous
Implications, in POLCE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223, 237 (Sowle ed. 1962). Furthermore, the safeguards against intimidation and trickery afforded by publicity, rules of trial
procedure, the presence of an impartial judicial officer, and representation by counsel are
wholly lacking in custodial interrogation. As a practical matter, there may be extra-legal
police methods for compelling disclosure far more severe than the legal sanctions threatened
or employed by a court. 8 WIGMoRE § 2252 n.27.
Nor is it clear that the Miranda extension "has no significant support in the history of
the privilege ..
" (White, J., dissenting in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 526). It has been argued
that the American police, in interrogating an accused, assume a function which has always
been within the spirit of the privilege, Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
MICH. L. REv. 59, 66 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar], and which is exactly the function
of the old English committing magistrate, before whom the privilege did apply. Morgan,
34 MINN. L. REv. at 22-7, 28 n.49. Since at the time of the Constitutional Convention an
accused was incompetent to testify at his own trial under the party interest rule, the protection of the accused at criminal trial could not have been the object of the framers of
the fifth amendment if they intended the provision to be other than a confirmation of the
common law. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
29 MICH. L. REv. 1-12 (1930); L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FI-rH AMENDMENT 407 (1968). In
light of the colonial experience with oppressive questioning of suspects by representatives
of the English crown, it may be that the drafters of the provision had chiefly in mind the
protection of the accused (and of the suspect not yet charged) from pre-trial questioning.
Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common Law? 4 AM. J. OF LEGAL HisT. 107, 114 n.20 (1960). In addition, the expansive readings accorded to the constitutional privilege in the past have been urged as precedent for
its recent extension to police interrogations.
The linguistic and historical barriers, whatever they were, which lay in the path
of Miranda'sapplication of the privilege to custodial questioning were considerably
less formidable than those surmounted when the privilege was applied to legisla-

tive investigations and civil proceedings. Kamisar at 64-5.

10 Both "custody" and "interrogation" are requisites for the application of the Miranda

waiver

rules.

An analysis of the myriad problems surrounding the questions of "custody"
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1
The four-fold warnings of legal rights required by Miranda ' were
designed to provide a suspect with an adequate basis for deciding
whethjy tg remain silent or to requ,.t punse!. Several recent stddis,
however, have challenged the Court's assumption that the required
warnings can provide concrete "'assurance of real understanding and
jnitel1igent exercie of t e privi ege [of silence]." '1 2 If the Mirandawarnings are ineffective, as these studies suggest,14 it would seem that the
primary bulwark against the erosion of constitutional rights in cust9d1l interrpgations' 4 must be furnished by Miranda's second principal requirement---that the §uspect ",oliuntarily, kppwin gy and
5
intelligently'" waive his rights prior to any interrogation.' As the practice of giving warnings becqmes standardized among law enforcement
offiers,16 the admisibility of challenged, confessions will hinge inand "interrogation" is beyond the -scope of this Comment. Fora critical examination of
these issues see Grahapa, What is "Custodial Interrogation?":California'sAnticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.LA.L. REv. 59 (1966).
11 An accused must be wared in "clear and unequivocal terms" that he "has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 467-8 and
at 479. The Miranda opinion itself is not clear whether police are required to give a
warning that any statements made by the accused will be used against him. Compare id. at
469 ("can and will') with id. at 479 ("can') and id. at 444 ("may'). In Craft v. United
States, 403 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1968), the Ninth Circuit, rejectipg the defendant's argument
that the warnings he received were inadequate because he was not admonished that any
information elicited from him "will be" used against him held that the accused was
sufficiently apprised of his Miranda rights by a warning that any statements "could be"
used against iim. Id. at 364.
12 384 US. at 469. See Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project:Interrogation oi Draft Protestors,77 YALE L.J. 300, 318 (1967); Project, Interrogationsin New Haven:
The lmpqct of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1614 (1967); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander,
Custodial Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66
Micn. L. REv. 1847 (1968).
13 Instead of strengthening the position of the suspect in a confrontation with police
interrogators, the Miranda warnings when given by police may in fact operate to
lessen the suspect's resistance to persuasion and help to induce his confession. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HAav. L. R v. 42, 61 (1968) states: "But

another reason for the association between warnings and successful interrogation is the
experimental finding tlat 'one dissonance-reducing mechanism is to react to a forewarning
that one's belief's will be attacked with a preparatory reduction in the belief level.'"
14 It is worth noting that ffcustodial interrogations" are by no means confined to the
formal petting of the station house, See note 10 szpra.
15 884 Us:'at 444, 479..The Court is not entirely dear whether Miranda permits police
to administer warnings and then to interrogate a suspect without first obtaining a waiver,
so long as a waiver isobtained before the suspect makes statements which are sought to be

notes 70-5 infra.
introduced in evidence at trial. See text accomiparyipg
16 At the present tine the pyaqtice of giving adequate warnings of legal rights appears
to be far from universal. See Project, Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,

76

YALE

L.J. 1519, 1550 (1967) (police station observers rqported that full Miranda warnings

were given to only 25 of 118 suspects (21%) questioned by police); Medalie, Zeitz &
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creasingly upon the courts' determihation that an accused made a valid
waiver of his Miraizda rights.
After outlining briefly the tdontrast between the Miranda WaiVer
rules and the rules for waiver of the fifth amendment privilege in
other proceedings, this comment will examine the lower courts' response to Miranda'smandate that a "voluntary, knowing and intelligent"
waiver is a prerequisite to admissibility. The troublesome waiver issues which have emerged from several factual situations will be investigated to determine if the lower courts are indeed striking a new
balance between the state's need for confessions and the suspect's interest in fair and decent treatment in custodial interrogations.
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT WAIVER IN OTHER PROCEEDINGS

"Waiver" is classically defined as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."1 7 The standards for
waiver of a constitutional right are inseparable from the definition
of the right,1 8 although the Court has often spoken of a monolithic
concept of waiver, applicable to all constitutional rights. t' For example, rigorous requirements must be met to waive the sixth amendment right to representation by counsel at trial,20 but less Severe StanAlexander, CustodialPolice Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Imple-

ment Miranda, 66 MicH. L. R v. 1347, 1365-6 n.67 (1968) (of 41 post-Miranda suspects interrogated by police, only 11 (27%) reported that they had received all four Miranda
warnings). However, the practice of reading warnings from a "Miranda card" would appear
to foreshadow the elimination of most issues of the adequacy of warnings where they are
, 247 A.2d 409 (Ct. Sp. App. 1968),
Md. App. given at all. See Hale v. State, where a Maryland court approved as "sound police practice" the reading of warnings
from standardized cards. For a list of studies on the effect of Miranda and police compliance, see Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, id. at 1349 n.li.
17

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US. 458, 464 (1938).

This approach to "waiver" issues is analytically useful since it avoids some of the
confusion that springs from the employment of the term "waiver." A literal emphasis on
the notion of "waiver" renders the concept of fifth amendment waiver somewhat paradoxical: Since the privilege against self-incrimination, by its terms, forbids compulsion to speak,
a waiver of the privilege literally denotes consent to compulsion; yet "it has never been
18

doubted that the privilege against self-incrimination, like all privileges ....

is waivable."

8 WIGMoRE § 2275.
19 See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 475.
20 The courts require that the right to counsel at trial be afforded the protection of the
court, Von Moltke v, Gillies, 332 US. 708 (1948)j and that any effective waiver be voluntarily and intelligently exercised. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). Failure to request the assistance of counsel at trial does not
constitute a waiver under the sixth amendment, Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949), and
Waiver Will not be presumed from a silent record, Garley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
See United Stites v. Glasser, 315 U.S, 60 (1942) (refusal to fifid a waiver of the right to
counsel at trial even though the defendant was himself an attorney).
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dards appear to apply for waiver of the fourth amendment right not
21
to be subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure.
In the proceedings to which the fifth amendment privilege applied
prior to Miranda,22 the standards for waiver of the privilege often
appeared to be less stringent than waiver standards for either fourth
or sixth amendment rights.23 Miranda guarantees both fifth and sixth
amendment rights to an in-custody suspect. Accordingly, the Court's
waiver rules reflect the distinction between waiver standards for the
fifth amendment privilege and those for the sixth amendment right
to counsel, since the absence of counsel at the interrogation markedly
24
raises the standards that must be met.
Prior to Miranda, the privilege could be waived either by contract
or other binding pledge before trial or, more commonly, by voluntary
21 A defendant may waive his fourth amendment right at the time the search and
seizure is made (by "consent" to a search) or at a later time (by procedural waiver of the
opportunity to litigate an asserted denial of the right at a later judicial proceeding, as by
failure to assert its deprivation). Where waiver is made by consent to a search, the burden
of showing that consent was freely given is on the government. Judd v. United States, 190
F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But many jurisdictions do not require that a specific warning of
fourth amendment rights be made. See, e.g., Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th
Cir. 1968); Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967). Contra: United States v.
Nikrash, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Noderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del.
1968); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa., 1966).
22 Before Miranda, the protection of the fifth amendment privilege extended "to all
manner of proceedings in which testimony is legally compellable, whether litigious or not
and whether ex parte or otherwise. It therefore applies in all kinds of courts (including
juvenile courts, when constituted as criminal courts), in all methods of interrogation before
a court, in coroner's inquests, in investigations by a grand jury, in investigations by a
legislature or a body having legislative functions, and in investigations by administrative
officials." 8 WiGMORE § 2266. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964).
23 See generally 8 WIGMoRE §§ 2275, 2276, and cases cited therein. A witness who makes
a partial admission may not be able to invoke the privilege to avoid answering further
questions, even if a reasonable probability of later punishment would flow from answering;
see Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (by answering that she had been the
treasurer of the Communist Party organization and that she had turned the records over
to "someone else," the witness waived the privilege at grand jury proceedings with respect
to the identity of the person to whom she had given the books). Waiver of the privilege
may also be inferred if the witness takes the stand to testify voluntarily; see Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958) ("Petitioner, as a party to the suit [a denaturalization
proceeding], was a voluntary witness. She could not take the stand to testify in her own
behalf and also claim the right to be free from cross examination on matters raised by her
own testimony on direct examination.')

.24 Although a showing of adequate warnings and effective waiver may not be necessary
if counsel is present at the interrogation, 384 U.S. at 466, the Court stressed that a "heavy
burden" rests on the government to prove waiver if a statement is taken in the absence of
counsel. Id. at 475. While the presence of an attorney may permit continued questioning
even after an accused indicates a desire to remain silent, id. at 474 n.44, the individual's
right to terminate questioning is absolute in the absence of counsel. Id. at 473-4.
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testimony in court.25 Aside from the directive that "an express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement followed closely
by a statement could constitute a waiver," 26 there is little specific
language in Miranda to explain how law enforcement officials are
to ascertain whether an in-custody suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. 27 But the Court does set forth a number
of instances in which a waiver will not be presumed. 28
Under the Court's new rules a waiver of the privilege during custodial interrogation differs from a waiver of the privilege in other proceedings in several important aspects. First, the witness or defendant
at trial, whether or not represented by counsel, may waive his right to
silence without being informed of it, but the interrogation suspect
must be told of his rights to silence and to the presence of counsel before he can effect a valid waiver. Second, although the witness or
defendant who testifies in other proceedings is often held to have
waived his privilege for reasons which have little to do with his subjective intent,29 an in-custody waiver of privilege arises only when
25 8 WIGMORE § 2275. It should be emphasized that the subject of discussion is waiver
of the substantive constitutional privilege itself, as opposed to waiver of the opportunity
to litigate an asserted denial of that right at a later judicial proceeding by failure to assert
its deprivation. See Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968); Hammonds
v. State, 422 P.2d 39 (Alas. 1968).
26 384 U.S. at 475.
27 In a significant footnote the Court notes that "the interviewing agent must exercise
his judgment in determining whether the individual waives his right to counsel. Because
of the constitutional basis of the right, however, the standard for waiver is necessarily high.
And, of course, the ultimate responsibility for resolving this constitutional question lies
with the courts." Id. at 486 n.55.
. 28 A waiver is automatically invalid if the required warnings are not given. Failure to
request an attorney does not constitute a waiver and "no effective waiver of the right to
counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made" after warnings.
Id. at 470. Waiver can never be presumed from a silent record or "simply from the silence
of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained," id. at 475; nor can a waiver be found from the fact that the accused
answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right
to remain silent when interrogated. Id. at 475-6. The Court declared that "any evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that
the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." Id. at 476. Moreover, "lengthy
interrogation or incommunicado incarceration" is to be considered "strong evidence" in
itself that a subsequent statement was not made pursuant to a valid waiver. Id. If at any
time the suspect indicates "in any manner" that he wishes to remain silent or that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking to police, there must be no further
questioning, even if an earlier waiver was validly obtained. Id. at 473-4. Any statements
obtained from an accused in violation of these rules are inadmissible against him in criminal prosecutions; no distinctions are to be made between "confessions" and "admissions"
or between inculpatory and exculpatory statements. Id. at 476-7.
29 See Note, Waiver of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 14 STAN. L. REy. 811,
813 (1962).
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the interrrogation suspect voluntarily elects to waive his privilege.
Third, although the witness or defendant at trial is held to have waived
his privilege as to at least some matters by testifying,30 an in-custody
waiver of privilege by a suspect extends only as far as he wishes to
extend it. Explicitly barring application of the waiver rule of Rogers
v. United States to custodial interrogation,! the Court in Miranda
introduced the concept of a terminable waiver of rights: under the
new rules interrogation must be stopped whenever the suspect so requests, even if it has begun after a valid waiver.-N Thus an assertion
of the privilege in custodial surroundings operates as a ban against
interrogation as well as "an option of refusal."
Many of these differences are explained by the sharp divergence between the policies which underlie the doctrine of waiver of rights
during custodial interrogation and those which underlie the doctrine
of waiver in other proceedings. In police interrogations there is no
danger of injury to adverse parties33 by depriving them of the power
of cross-examination, nor is there the danger that the fact-finding or
truth-finding functions of a jiadge or jury will be igrpaired by prejudiced or distorted narratives given under pretense of a claim of the
privilege. In custodial interroga4tions the safeguards against intimidation and trickery afforded by publicity, rules of trial procedure, and
the presence of counsel and an impartial judicial officer are lacking.
Sacrificing the suspect's interest to that of the state would enable law
enforcement officials to circumvent the s~feguard, of the accusatorial,
adversary tria, thus undermining one of the fundamental purposes of
the privilege-to redress inequalities in resources between state and
accused by requiring the prosecution at criminal trial to "shoulder

the entire load."3
Where the interrogation suspect has volunteered incriminating
facts which render other falcts or details innougus, one traditional
justifi ation for the doctrin pf w.iyer by testif "ngrempin applicable.
Such "ancillary" facts, it may be argued, should not be protected by
the privilege because there is no danger of further incrimination in
30 The rules fpr determinipg the scope of w yqr by 4 witps§ or , defendant at tri
are .byno menp Iniform. .ge 8 WGM9gR § 2
§ee not 5 supra.
P ?84 U.p t 469 n.45. For a spitement of the holding in o

Pq id.qt 47M:.

8 TheW isit dnger of injury to otr suqppcrs heldi for the samne offens as tlie
pgysgn
intreog
. If t e sspect interrogated is g1j .y 4ut claims te prvilege the oter ns~pet_
are unable to obtain a speedy release from custody. The Miranda Court, however, dd not
consider this danger to be significant. See id. at 482,
34 See id. at 460; 8 WiGMORE § 2251.
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view of the prior disclosure. 8 This analysis raises, but does not answer,
the question who shall decide what facts are ancillary to the prior
disclosure.3 If police are viewed as adversaries, and not as impartial
fact-finders, then the strength of the policies underlying the privilege
may justify the Court's rule allowing only the accused himself to determine the extent of waiver, at least in situations where only the
police and the accused are present at interrogation.
II. THE LowER

COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE MIRANDA WAIVER RULES

Once it has been determined that adequate Miranda warnings have
been administered, courts have examined the particular facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a suspect has waived
his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel at the
interrogation.3 7 The Miranda Court indicated that it sought to avoid
case-by-case inquiries into special circumstances, 38 but the difficult particular-circumstances approach for judicial review of challenged confession cases enjoys continued vitality under the Mirandawaiver rules.
A more troublesome development has been the courts' interpretation of the considerable ambiguities in the Miranda waiver rules to
achieve standards for waiver which often seem to undercut many of
the Supreme Court's goals. The Court made it clear that its requirement of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver imposed a more
rigorous standard for admissibility than the "voluntariness" test,3 9 but
;5 See Rogers v. United States, 840 US. 367, 374-5 (1951); Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266,
274-5 (1869).
38 Under the standards for waiver by testifying, a major focus of controversy is what
facts are, or should be, considered ancillary to an initial, apparently incriminating disclosure. See Note, Waiver of PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 14 ST4,N. L. REV. 811 (1962);
Boudin, The Constitutional Privilege in Operation, 12 LAw, Gvuri REv. 128 (1952).
37 See, e.g., Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329-30 (5th Cir. 1966): "[TMhe cases in which
it is clear that the warnings have been given must be considered on their own facts in order
to determine the question of waiver. The courts must do this on an ad hoc basis, since no
per se rule has been adopted dealing with the problem."
0$ $84 US. at 468-9: "Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can
never be more than speculation; a warning is a clear:cut fict.'l
See id. n38,
The case-by-case examination of the circumstances of each interrogation and the conduct
of each defendant under the traditional "voluntariness" test proved extremely complex and
produced extraordinary divisions in the Court on confessions issues. See Ritz, Twenty-five
Years of State Criminal Confessions Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH.& LEE L.
REv. 35 (1962).
09 "In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary
in traditional terms.... The fact remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the
statements were truly the product of a free choice." 384 U.S. at 457.
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once the required warnings have been given the emerging lower court
standards for waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights often appear to be
indistinguishable from the traditional standard for admissibility. Several courts applying the Miranda rules have ignored the question of
waiver entirely, in effect finding a waiver from the fact of a voluntary
40
statement after warnings.
In analyzing the response of the lower courts to the Miranda waiver
rules, it is appropriate to examine several recurring factual situations
which illuminate particular ambiguities in the Miranda opinion. A
rough but useful classification is to group the waiver issues into four
categories: the form, content, and timing of a Miranda waiver; police
practices affecting the validity of a waiver; multiple interrogation
sessions; and the suspect's powers of resistance.
A. The Form, Content, and Timing of a Waiver of Miranda Rights
The Mirandaopinion does not make clear what post-warning actions
and words of a suspect are necessary to constitute a valid waiver. Questions such as whether an express, affirmative statement of waiver is
required by Miranda,whether the oral waiver of a suspect who refuses
to make a written statement of waiver is valid, what form of oral
statement is sufficient to establish a suspect's intention to waive his
rights, and whether any interrogation may take place before the accused has waived his rights have not yet been resolved satisfactorily by
the lower courts.
1. The Necessity for an Express, Affirmative Statement of Waiver.
One of the sharpest waiver controversies raised after Miranda focuses
on the necessity for an express, affirmative statement of waiver-written or oral-after warnings have been administered. The Miranda
opinion is ambiguous on this issue, although the dissenting opinions
40 See, e.g., Embrey v. State, Ala. , 214 So.2d 567 (1968), where the interrogating
officer testified that the accused knew "what he was doing" and "seemed to want to cooperate in trying to get down to the truth." The Alabama Supreme Court, finding that
adequate warnings had been administered and that no threats had been employed, stated
simply that "[t]here is nothing in this record even remotely tending to show that the
defendant expressed a desire to consult with a lawyer before or after the questioning or
to have a lawyer present at the questioning." "[W]e are of the opinion that no violation of
Miranda is shown." Id. at , 214 So. 2d at 572. See also State v. Auger, 43 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.
1968), where the Supreme Court of Missouri held admissible statements by a suspect who
said that he understood the warnings, but refused to sign a written waiver form, although
he stated that "he didn't mind talking about it," after which he proceeded to discuss all
the details of the crime freely. Scrupulously avoiding any mention of the "waiver" concept,
the Missouri court found that "upon this evidence the admission and statements were not,
as a matter of law, involuntary and they were not inadmissible upon that basis." Id. at 6.
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of both Justice Clark and Justice Harlan indicate that an affirmative
41
statement of waiver is now required.
Two interpretations of particular passages in Mirandahave emerged
from decisions holding that an express, affirmative waiver is not required. The first is that a "fully effective equivalent" of the warnings
and waiver specified by Miranda may be found in the facts and circumstances of the particular case.42 The second is that the Miranda
opinion, by specifying that an express statement "could" constitute a
43
waiver, does not rule out other possibilities.
When interrogation is pursued in the absence of counsel, the "fully
effective equivalent" interpretation appears to be unsound. The qualification that warnings and waiver are required only in the absence of a
"fully effective equivalent" stems from the Miranda Court's desire to
stimulate experimentation by the states with alternative systems; 44 it
anticipates the employment of procedural safeguards which will take
the place of both warnings and waiver. The Court suggested that provision of station house counsel is one such acceptable alternative.45 Another often-suggested alternative procedure is requiring that an explanation of the nature and significance of the rights to silence and the
presence of counsel at interrogation be given by a magistrate, and that
waivers be made under judicial supervision. 46 Where such alternative
procedures are not employed, there would appear to be no sound basis
41 "Indeed, even in Escobedo the Court never hinted that an affirmative 'waiver' was a
prerequisite to questioning; . . .", 384 U.S. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting). "To forgo these
rights, some affirmative statement of rejection is seemingly required ....
", id. at 504
(Harlan, J., dissenting); and at 516, "To require also an express waiver by the suspect and
an end to questioning whenever he demurs must heavily handicap questioning." Several
commentators have so interpreted Miranda. See N. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS
-MIRANDA v. ARIZONA 75 (1966); BJ. GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS ON EVIDENCE
IN CiMbNAL CASES 119, 120 (1966); A NEW LOOKc AT CONFESSIONS: EsCOBED--THE SECOND
RouND 76 (B.J. George, Jr. ed. 1967).
42 See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006
(1968); Mullaney v. State, Md. App. -,
246 A.2d 291 (Ct. Sp. App. 1968); Brown v.
State, 3 Md. App. 313, 239 A.2d 761 (Ct. Sp. App. 1967).
43 See Sullins v. United States, 389 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1968) (Lewis, J., dissenting):
I do not agree, as I read the main opinion to hold, that an express declination of
the right to counsel is an absolute from which, and only from which, a valid waiver
can flow. Miranda states that such a declination followed closely by a statement
"could" constitute a waiver. It does not negate other possibilities.
The dissenting view in Sullins was adopted in dictum by the 10th Circuit in Bond v.
United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968), where the defendant signed a formal written
waiver of rights prior to any questioning.
44 384 U.S. at 467.
45 Id. at 466. "The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the
adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform
to the dictates of the privilege."
46 See Developments, 79 HARv. L. REv. at 1007.
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for ernplOying the Stiprediie G6uits "filly effectiVe eqiValent' lkAi
guage to hold that an express stateefit Of WAivef ig not iequifed.
The "other possibilities" intdrpettittrl is fiiobi laiigibl&. Thig interpretation seems gomewhAt iitolnsinterit With th d ouft'§ ftbibigtiiis
direttive that any Waiver of the iight to cihfis~l thaist bd "pecifitally
madd," btit "specifically fnade" inay Or mAy not ineafii an expiess
stattment 47 and the context of the "specifically made" passage makes
it at least questionable that this passage was intended to be a decisive
pronouncement of the Court's standards for waiver. 48 If this atialyis
is sound, the Miranda opiniort does hot iequife ati express WaiVer in
all ta~es,
In view bf the ambiguity of the Stiprbtn Oourt's ditectives, it is not
surprising that the lower cotitts have divided oh whether at affiriatiVe
statemfit 6f WaiVek is an bolite prefeqtiisite to admissibility under
4 9 Thd prifidipal cad holdiug that Aii expfess statemhiit of
Miranda.
waiver is hot tdquifdd is United States V. HaYes. 50 The unusual facts
of Hayeg hiefit close ekanlinatibih, siric the holdiiig of the case appears
to have beeh dxteiided inprudehitly by 6thef courts. Hayes Was atrted
in mid-aftefinoii by FBI agents who t6k him tW a local polic6 station,
fully Warned hiti of hi§ Mifdnda rights alid peitmitted him t6 make
a phOhe tall. Th6 ageits did hot ask HAyes if he undetstood the
Mirtaidd Wafnirlgs 6f desired counsel, And he did not Volunteer any
such information. After approximately thirty minutes of questioning,
47 See Sullins v. United States, 889 F.d 995 (10th-Cir. 1968), Where the Zourt split on
this question.
48 "Ah individual need not make a pre-inierr6gatiofi reqiest ior a lawyei. While such
request affirmatively setures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does n6t
constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be
recognized unless specifically made after the Warnings we here delineate have been given.
The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be
the person who most needs counsel." 884 U.S. at 470-1. the Court'% tiphasis seems to be
that a valid Waiver, however it is made, can only be effected after iWariingi have been
administered.
49 Affirmative statement necessary: e.g., 8ullin-4 . United States, 389 F. d 98 (lth Cir.
, 294 ls.Y.S.2d 249 (Nassau County Ct.
Misc. 2d 1068); People v. Anonymous, , 294 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Nass~ii County Ct. 1968);
Misc. 2d 1968); People v. Jacobson, People v. Kessler 53 Misd. 2d 268; 278 NXY.S.2d 423 (Allegany County Ct. 1967). Affirmative
statement not necessdy: e.g., United Stkteg v. Hayes; 385 F2d 375 (4th Gir. 1967), cert.
.g. 1006 (i9685; Mullihey v. 8thte, ----Md. App. -----; 246 A.2d 291 (Ct. Sp.
detWed, 369
App. i9689; &iowhir. Sfate, 8 Md. App. 913, 39 A.2d '?61 (dt: Sp; App. 196'. Several courts
have, without discussing the point, in effect fouiid a ialid waivdr in ithE befiee 6f an
affirmative oral or written statement of waiver. See, e.g., Alexander v. tiited States, 380
F.2d 93 ( di Cir. iNO7); People V.Lavergne, 64 dal. 2d 269, 411 P.2d 369, 49 Cal. Rptr. 557
(19'); Pe6pit V.Hill, 89 Ii1 2d 125, 233 4.E.2d 36 (1968); State V.Ftat~r, - Kan. -- , 447
P.2d 405 (1968); Charles v. State of Texas, 424 S.W.2d 909, (Teil. drini. tt. A15p. 1967).
G0 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. defiied, 90 US. 1006 (968).
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which elicited incriminating statements later used at his trial, he suddenly terminated the interrogation by declaring that he would not
answer further questions and demanded that he be allowed to see a
lawyer. Hayes never confessed. The Fourth Circuit, affirming his conviction for transporting counterfeit checks in interstate commerce,
expressly rejected Hayes' contention that a waiver of rights could
not be found in the absence of an express post-warning statement of
waiver.5 1 The court stated that an affirmative statement is "not an
essential link in the chain of proof" of waiver and the "mere absence
of such a statement will not preclude as a matter of law the possibility
52
of an effective waiver."
Finding a waiver of Miranda rights in the absence of an express
statement of waiver seems appropriate only in an extremely narrow
range of situations. In Hayes the suspect's later assertion of his rights
made it clear, despite his silence after warnings, that he had understood
the warnings, that he was aware of his rights and knew how to exercise them, and that he consented at first to be questioned. Where a
suspect's silence in response to warnings is followed only by a statement or by answers to questions, these inferences will seldom stand
out as clearly. The holding of some courts that an affirmative statement of waiver is not required in such cases5 3 seems unwarranted.
This approach, which in effect finds a waiver from the fact that a
suspect has been warned and has subsequently made a voluntary
statement, closely resembles the standard, explicitly rejected in
Miranda,which presumes a waiver from the fact that an accused eventually confesses after police warnings are administered. If the Court's
new waiver rules were intended to impose a stricter standard for ad51 Id. at 378:
Miranda admonishes: "The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant." (Emphasis supplied).... We simply decide today that strong and unmistakable circumstances, upon occasion, may satisfactorily establish such an equivalent.
52 Id. at 377-8.
153See Mullaney v. State, Md. App. , 246 A.2d 291 (Ct. Sp. App. 1968), where a
Maryland court found that a voluntary and intelligent waiver was established by the
testimony of police that the suspect "shook his head like he understood" and "just nodded
his head in a yes position" in response to a post-warning inquiry whether, "having these
rights in mind," he wanted to talk to the police. Officers at the site of the arrest proceeded
to question the accused, although he appeared "sullen and angry" and did not respond at
all to police questions until some time later, while he was being taken to the police station.
Cf. United States v. Hayes, supra note 50, at 378, where the Hayes court noted that "mere
silence of the accused followed by grudging responses to leading questions will be entitled

to very little probative value in light of the inherently coercive atmosphere of in-custody
interrogation."
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missibility than the earlier "voluntariness" test, more than a showing
of warnings followed by a suspect's apparent willingness to answer
questions should be required to establish a valid waiver.54
Two major policies would be served by requiring an express, affirmative statement of waiver in all cases as an absolute prerequisite to
admissibility. First, since police interrogators would be required to
ask for a statement of waiver if the suspect did not volunteer one, such
a requirement would advance the goal of assuring that the suspect is
made aware of "his interrogators' willingness to recognize his rights
should he choose to exercise them." Second, although a "boilerplate
statement" of waiver may not be sufficient in itself to establish the
validity of a waiver, since such a statement could always be the result
of coercion, ignorance, or diminished intelligence, 55 the presence of an
affirmative statement would be a readily ascertainable fact, which
would substantially lessen the burden of the reviewing court, particularly in cases where the suspect exhibits inconsistent or vacillating intentions at the interrogation.
These considerations apply with equal force to the holding of some
courts that a valid waiver is established by a post-warning statement
that the suspect understands (as opposed to waives) his rights. 5 Clearly
an individual may understand his rights without wishing to waive
them. 57 Since it is unlikely that a suspect would manifest his decision
to cooperate with the police by refusing to give an express waiver or
by giving an ambiguous statement of waiver, law enforcement officials
should experience no difficulty in obtaining an express waiver from
those suspects who are in fact willing to waive their rights.
2. The Sufficiency of Oral and Written Statements of Waiver. Like
54 Thus, in Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J.), the
court emphasized that Miranda requires that "'[t]he record must show, or there must
be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything else is not waiver."' Id. at 821
(quoting 384 U.S. at 475, emphasis by the court). The court went on to say: "The immediate
availability of offered counsel at the place of interrogation is, of course, a primary consideration in determining the bona fides of the offer and the validity of the waiver." Id.
at 822.
55 See 384 U.S. at 492, where the Court said of Miranda's signed confession "[t~he mere
fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in cjause stating that he had
'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver
required to relinquish constitutional rights."
56 See People v. Stewart, 264 Cal. App. 2d 944, 70 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1968); People
v. Midkoff, 262 Cal. App. 2d 804, 68 Cal. Rptr. 866 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Carter, 258
Cal. App. 2d 727, 65 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Fuller, Cal. App.
2d ,74 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Ct. App. 1969). Contra, People v. Anonymous, Misc. 2d ,
294 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Nassau County Ct. 1968).
67 See People v. Anonymous, Misc. 2d , 294 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Nassau County Ct.

1968).
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the requirement of an express, affirmative statement of waiver, a categorical requirement of a written waiver of Miranda rights would
avoid some "swearing contests" at trial between police interrogators
and the suspect and would help to impress a suspect with an appreciation that his statements can be used in evidence against him. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's new waiver rules do not demand that
waivers be made in writing, and the lower courts have held that a
waiver of Mirandarights may be written 58 or oral,59 and may be made
spontaneously by the suspect as a reaction to the Miranda warnings or
elicited by inquiries from interrogators after warnings have been
60
given.
A noteworthy complication arises when a suspect willingly talks to
police interrogators but refuses to execute a waiver in writing.6 ' In
cases where other indications of the suspect's intentions to waive are
ambiguous, some courts have considered such a refusal as a circumstance indicating that a purported oral waiver was not validly obtained, 62 but many lower courts have upheld the validity of an oral
waiver despite an express refusal to make a waiver in writing.63 The
Attorney General of California noted recently that if signed waivers
became the general rule, undue significance could attach to a suspect's
58 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 399 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1968); West v. United States,
399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hail, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1968).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Boykin, 398 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Corbbins, 397 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1968); Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968);
Solino v. United States, 387 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1968); Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260
(9th Cir. 1967).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1968) (written); Miller v. United
States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968) (oral).
61 See, e.g., Hodge v. United States, 392 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968).
62 In People v. Thiel, 26 App. Div. 2d 897, 274 N.YS.2d 417 (1966) the defendant, during
interrogation, stated only that he would talk to a trooper and would not sign a statement.
The New York court held that the defendant's response, when considered in light of his
tenth grade education and lack of previous experience with the police, fell considerably
short of indicating that "he understood the full import of the officer's statement and that
he knowingly waived his right to counsel," id. at 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 418, and indicated
instead that he was not willing to give a statement in a form which could be used in
evidence against him. In United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968), the defen,
dant told interrogators that he had retained counsel and would not sign a waiver of rights
form or "anything" until he had spoken to his attorney. However, he declined to call his
attorney, saying that he would call later in the morning, and he said that questioning
could continue. The Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's responses indicated that he
desired to remain "silent," and that the inconsistency of the defendant's refusal to sign the
waiver form, followed by an apparent willingness to allow further questioning, should have
alerted the agents to inquire further to ascertain whether "his apparent change of position
was the product of intelligence and understanding or of ignorance and confusion." Id. at
853.
68 See, e.g., Hodge v. United States, 392 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968); Keegan v. United States,
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refusal to sign a written waiver form, since "[m]any experienced de64
fendants are willing to talk but absolutely refuse to sign anything."
Yet a suspect's refusal to execute a written waiver seems to reflect some
hesitancy to abandon his Miranda rights. Where the suspect has had
little or no previous exposure to police interrogation and subsequent
criminal prosecution, it may even be doubtful that the suspect is in
fact aware that he is relinquishing his legal rights by making an oral
statement of waiver. If written waivers are not required, it should be
incumbent upon police interrogators to make it clear to the suspect
that an oral waiver is just as binding as a written waiver and may be
of equally decisive legal effect.
The form of an oral waiver sufficient to establish a suspect's intention to waive is apparently quite flexible. The courts have generally
tejected the argument that a formal recitation of waiver-"I have no
desire to remain silent and I do not want an attorney"-is necessary,6 5
and a wide range of oral expressions have been held sufficient to effect
a valid waiver66 unless the statement is ambiguous 67 or there is evi68
dence of police coercion.

Even in the absence of ambiguity or evidence of coercion, however,
358 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 967 (1968); Tucker v. United States, 375
F.2d 363 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967); United States v. Jackson, 287 F. Supp.
80 (D. Conn. 1968); United States v. Burley, 280 F. Supp. 672 (D. Del. 1968); State v. Magee,
52 N.J. 352, 245 A.2d 339 (1968); State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968).
64 B.J. GEORGE, JR., A NEw LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDo-THE SECOND ROUND 76
(1967).
65 State v. Kremens, 52 N.J. 303, 245 A.2d 813 (1968); Brisbon v. State, 201 So. 2d 832
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Boykin, 398 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1968) ("I might as well tell you
about it.'); Keegan v. United States, 385 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1967) ("I don't have nothing to
hide. I will answer anything within reason.'); Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alas. 1968)
Mass.
("Oh well, I might as well tell you about it now.'); Commonwealth v. Fisher, , 238 N.E.2d 525 (1968) ("I will."); State v. Ransom, 182 Neb. 243, 153 N.W.2d 916 (1967)
("Yes."); State v. Graves, S.D. , 163 N.W.2d 542 (1968) ("I will answer what I can.')
67 See United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968) (statement that interrogators
"could proceed with the questioning" insufficient where defendant had earlier refused to
sign a waiver form until he had spoken with his attorney but had declined to call his
attorney, saying "it could wait until later.'); Craig v. State, 216 So. 2d 19 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1968) (alternate holding) (defendant's statement that "in a way" he would like to have
an attorney, but that he did not "see how it can help me" held inadequate to constitute a
clear and unequivocal waiver); People v. Thiel, 26 App. Div. 2d 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d 417
(1966) (defendant's statement that he would talk to a trooper but would not sign a statement, when considered in light of his educational background and lack of previous experience with the law, insufficient to waive counsel). See also Brown v. Heyd, 277 F. Supp. 899
(E.D. La. 1967) ("I know all of that" insufficient to waive the accused's right to Miranda
warnings).
68 See United States v. Low, 257 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ("All right" held insufficient to effect waiver where the suspect was interrogated between 1:00 and 2:00 AM arid
was told by police that it would be easier on him if he cooperated).
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closer judicial scrutiny should be given to the form of police questions
which elicit a suspect's oral statement of waiver. The finding of one
recent study6 9 that a significant number of suspects fail to understand
the Miranda warnings suggests that to ensure an informed choice by
the suspect to speak or to remain silent, interrogating officers should
be required to explain both the Mirandawarnings and the nature and
meaning of a "waiver" of constitutional rights. A formal reading of
warnings followed by a request for a "waiver" may be less meaningful
to a suspect than the questions: Do you understand that you don't
have to answer any questions, that you can have a lawyer here with
you before we ask you any questions, and that if you want an attorney
we will get one for you now, without charge? Do you understand that
anything you say can be used in evidence against you at a later trial?
Knowing this, do you still want to answer our questions now without
a lawyer? Unless police interrogators take pains to insure that a suspect
does in fact understand both his legal rights and the significance of
waiving these rights, the procedure of warnings and waiver may be
only an ineffective preliminary ritual to interrogation.
3. The Need for a Waiver Prior to Any Interrogation. The Court
explicitly stated that four-fold warnings of legal rights must precede
all interrogation of an in-custody accused.7° Whether a waiver of rights
must also precede custodial interrogation is unclear from the Miranda
opinion.7 1 The majority opinion comes close to saying that there can
be no interrogation of an in-custody accused before a waiver, 72 but the
Court does not expressly and unequivocably forbid custodial interrogation after warnings have been given and before a waiver is obtained,
as long as the prosecution introduces into evidence only those statements which were made after a waiver.
69 See Medalie, Zeitz 8, Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. Rlv. 1347, 1375-6 (1968).
70 384 U.S. at 444, 467-8, 479.
71 It may be permissible for police to ask some questions before obtaining a waiver, so
long as they do not interrogatethe suspect. "Surely, the suspect can be asked what he wants
for lunch without securing a waiver of rights, even though one can conjure up cases in
which the answer would turn out to be incriminating." Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?": California'sAnticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
59, 96 (1966). But see Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J.).
72 For example, the Court states that "Opportunity to exercise these rights must be
afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement." 384 US. at 479. "The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is
allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he
can be interrogated." Id. at 478. The dissenting opinions of Justices Clark and White
interpret the majority opinion as holding that a waiver of rights must precede interrogation. See id. at 502, 537-8.
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This issue has rarely been litigated; one court, however, has held
73
that an express waiver must precede all custodial interrogation.
Even commentators expressing their hostility to the Supreme Court's
limitations on police interrogations have assumed that under the new
rules interrogation cannot begin until after a valid waiver.7 4 A "waiver"
which results only after some interrogation by police may well be the
product of the interrogation rather than of the suspect's "free and informed" choice. Requiring an express waiver before any interrogation
would guard against this danger and would provide a major bulwark
for preventing the interrogation of a suspect against his will, a concern
implicit in Miranda's holding that interrogation must be stopped
whenever the suspect so requests, even if it has begun after a valid
7 5

waiver.

B. Police PracticesAffecting the Validity of a Waiver
The Mirandawaiver rules enable the courts to exercise some supervision over the post-warning practices of police interrogators, since the
validity of a waiver is affected by the conduct of police after warnings
have been given.7 6 The general requirement that a waiver be made
"voluntarily," and the Court's explicit prohibitions against lengthy interrogation, incommunicado detention, and obtaining a waiver by
threats, trickery, or cajolery seem to strike directly at police abuses and
suggest that a "police practices" analysis of the type utilized by the
courts under the "totality of circumstances" test 77 is appropriate under

the Supreme Court's new waiver rules.
1. Interrogation Tactics. To what extent the Court's waiver rules
inhibit police conduct is uncertain. For instance, the Court stated that
"lengthy interrogation" is to be considered as "strong evidence" of an
invalid waiver,7 8 but a different result may be reached in a particular
case depending upon whether the number of questions, the number
of minutes it takes police to ask them, or the total time the suspect is
in custody is taken as the appropriate measure of the "length" of
questioning.7 9 Even greater difficulties attach to the Court's proscripPeople v. Keesler, 53 Misc. 2d 268, 278 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Allegany County Ct. 1967).
See F. INBAU & J. REEm, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 4-5 (2d ed. 1967).
75 884 U.S. at 473-4, 475-6.
76 See 384 U.S. at 475-7.
77 See Developments, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 935, 969 (1966). Under the "totality" view the
Supreme Court has considered such police tactics as physical abuse, threats, extensive questioning, and incommunicado detention. See note 2 supra.
78 384 U.S. at 476.
79 Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation?":California'sAnticipatory Application of
Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 59, 98 (1966).
73
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tion against obtaining a waiver by threats, trickery, or cajolery.80 In
particular cases it may be difficult to determine whether the actions of
police interrogators fall within these categories. 81 Where the challenged police behavior consists of spoken words, judicial supervision
may be particularly difficult. The tone of a detective's voice and the
context in which the words are spoken are factors difficult to review,
but each may profoundly affect the suspect's decision to waive his rights
or answer questions.
The express prohibition in the Mirandaopinion of threats, trickery,
and cajolery is confined to their use in obtaining a waiver. Although
the Court criticized the deceptive strategems advocated by police interrogation manuals,8 2 it did not expressly proscribe such techniques
once the required warnings have been given and a waiver has been
obtained. Inbau and Reid, writing post-Miranda, maintain that "all
but a very few of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented
in our earlier publication are still valid if used after the recently prescribed warnings have been given to the suspect under interrogation,
and after he has waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right
to counsel."8' 3 They continue to advocate many of the tactics expressly
criticized by the Supreme Court, such as minimizing the moral significance of the offense8 4 and casting blame on the victim or on society.8 5
Moreover, so long as it is not "of such a nature as to induce a false
confession," Inbau and Reid recommend the continued employment
of police trickery and deceit to elicit a confession." A recent study
indicates that police interrogators still utilize coercive tactics such as
"Mutt and Jeff" routines, outright trickery, relay questioning, and
80 384 Us. at 476.

81 Compare, e.g., People v. Russell, 259 Cal. App. 2d 637, 66 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App.
1968) (officer's statement that it might be better for the defendant if he talked held a threat
which nullified a prior Miranda warning and invalidated a subsequent waiver) with People
v. McGuire, 39 I1. 2d 244, 234 N.E.2d 772 (1968) (officer's statement that it would be better
for the defendant if he talked held not to be a threat or inducement).
82 384 U.S. at 448-55. The Court was particularly critical of F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962).

83 F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (2d ed. 1967).
84 Id. at 40-2. Compare 384 U.S. at 450.
85 F. INBAU & J. REIM, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 47-59 (2d ed. 1967). Compare 384 U.S. at 450.
86 According to Inbau and Reid, leading the suspect to believe that there is more proof
of his guilt than actually exists, deceiving the suspect into believing that an accomplice has
confessed and implicated both himself and the suspect, staging mock "identifications" of
the suspect by police officers posing as witnesses, and eliciting a handwritten statement of
guilt from the suspect by the use of fake notes purporting to come from another prisoner
are all tactics recommended "until such time as they may be specifically prohibited."
F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 85, at 195-7.
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playing off co-suspects.87 Many of these tactics would seem vulnerable
to constitutional attack, even under the less rigorous standards of due
process, but apparently no lower court has held that the utilization of
such techniques after both warnings and waiver, of itself, invalidates
a waiver.18
Deceptive police strategems, however, are clearly inimical to the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege-"the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.""9 If
the required warnings were designed to protect the privilege of silence
by assuring the suspect that he need not speak at all, it seems inconsistent to permit the employment of tactics intended to create in the
suspect the impression that he must talk. Such practices appear to be
fundamentally at odds with the Court's aim of assuring "that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process."90 It may be extremely difficult to define standards for proper police interrogation, 9 ' but if
Miranda's goal of a "free and informed" choice to speak or remain
silent is to be taken seriously, it would appear that the utilization of
such tactics after both warnings and waiver should materially increase
the government's burden to show that the accused made a valid, continuing waiver. It seems paradoxical to treat misleading police conduct
unfavorably under the voluntary-confessions doctrine,9 2 while permitting deceptive police practices under the stricter fifth amendment
standard.
2. The Necessity for Police Admonitions Beyond the Required
Warnings. There are situations in which the standard of a "knowing"
waiver may require police interrogators to provide a suspect with more
87 See Project, Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1542-9 (1967).
88 This result does not seem to be attributable solely to the difficult problems of proof
which must be overcome to establish the historical facts of secret interrogations, even
though the lack of a record of an interrogation still appears to be the rule. Before Miranda
the California courts apparently held that the employment of such tactics signaled the
onset of the "accusatory stage" of criminal investigation, and that such tactics could not,
therefore, be utilized unless preceded by the warnings of rights required under the broad
California interpretation of Escobedo. See Graham, "What is Custodial Interrogation?":
California'sAnticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. at 59.
89 384 U.S. at 460.
90 Id. at 469.
91 See ALl MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 5.04, Commentary at 178-9:
One of the most difficult questions in connection with the Code is determining
what should be provided with respect to the use of deception in seeking information from suspects. The propriety of techniques such as those catalogued in detail
in Inbau and Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962), has been the
subject of sharply conflicting views.
92 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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information than the four-fold Miranda warnings. In a pre-Miranda
case, People v. Lacy,93 the New York Appellate Division held that a
waiver of counsel during interrogation was precluded by the failure to
inform an 18 year-old in-custody suspect that an attorney had inquired
about him at the place where suspects were normally held after arrest. 94
The Appellate Division noted that "had the [suspect] been advised that
an attorney had appeared to represent him, pursuant to his request
at the time of arrest, he may well have chosen to remain silent until
counsel had an opportunity to advise him." 95 According to the New
York court's analysis, the result would now seem to be compelled by
Miranda's requirement of a "knowing" waiver. 96
The Lacy rationale applies only to a limited range of situations. A
broader issue is whether police interrogators must inform a suspect
of the nature and seriousness of the charges against him. The few decisions which have confronted this question are in conflict.
The Fourth Circuit recently followed the pre-Miranda rule97 and
93 26 App. Div. 2d 982, 274 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1966).
94 Id. at 983, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The Lacy decision rested on exclusionary principles
developed from New York's constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to due
process, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel. See also People v.
Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414, 216 N.E.2d 582 (1966); People v. Sanchez, 15
N.Y.2d 887, 259 N.Y..2d 409, 207 N.E.2d 856 (1965); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 257
N.Y.S.2d 924, 205 N.E.2d 852 (1965); People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267, 199
N.E.2d 366 (1964); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 248 N.Y.S.2d 841, 198 N.E.2d 628 (1963).
95 26 App. Div. at 983, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
96 The Court in Miranda deemphasized the sixth amendment rationale of Escobedo and
appeared to require counsel only as a device for protecting the fifth amendment privilege.
Nevertheless, the Court's apparent concern to encourage the presence of counsel at interrogation has prompted some courts to speculate in dictum that higher standards for waiver
should apply to suspects who are known to be represented by retained or appointed counsel.
See United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1968); Mathies v. United States, 874 F.2d
812, 816 n.$ (D.C. Cir. 1967).
The New York Court of Appeals (subsequent to the Lacy decision discussed in the text)
has promulgated the broad rule that once police become aware that an attorney has
entered the proceedings, they may not question the suspect or elicit a waiver from him.
See People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1967). See also People
v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968). The New York position
has not been followed in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Whitewater, Ore. -,
445 P.2d 594 (1968). Several courts have held that an accused may waive his Miranda rights
in the absence of and without notice to previously retained or appointed counsel. See
Wilson v. United States, 898 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1968); Coughlan v. United States, 891 F.2d
371 (9th Cir. 1968); Gunter v. State, 421 S.W.2d 657. (rex. Ct. Crim. App. 1967). But see
dissenting opinion in Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d at 374.
97 Pre-Mirandacases did not require police to inform an accused of the precise charges
against him or of the range of possible punishments which might ensue from his conviction,
even in the dramatic case where, unknown to the accused, his victim had died and possible
murder charges were pending against him. See United States ex rel. Kern v. Maroney, 275
F. Supp. 435 (withholding information that victim of robbery had died of stroke); People v.
Allen, 8 Mich. App. 408, 154 N.W.2d 570 (1967) (withholding until after incriminating
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rejected the argument that a robbery suspect could not "knowingly"
waive his rights unless interrogating officers informed him of the
punishment he might receive if convicted. 98 Similarly, in State v. Lucero,99 the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a murder conviction,
finding a waiver because the suspect's exculpatory statemehts 00 established that she knew that she was a murder suspect and because she
was "adequately advised as to why she was being held, why she was
being questioned, and was aware of these matters including the gravity
thereof."'1 1 The suspect in Lucero was advised prior to interrogation
that she was arrested for "an assault on her husband." The police informed her that her husband was dead and that she was being questioned "concerning her husband," but avoided the word "murder"
and did not advise the suspect of the statutory punishment for murder.
In Schenk v. Ellsworth,10 2 the United States District Court for the
District of Montana differed with the Lucero result, holding that the
requirement of a "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" waiver requires
interrogating officers to inform an in-custody suspect of the crime he
is suspected of having committed before a statement can be taken. The
court emphasized that it was "not establishing a requirement that a
suspect be advised with technical precision what formal charge or
charges are contemplated,"' 0 3 but it found that a statement that police
wanted to talk to the defendant "in connection with the shooting incident of his wife" was inadequate to support the defendant's purported waiver of rights since he was not advised that he was suspected
of having murdered his wife. 10 4 "Certainly it stands to reason that a
statements were obtained, information that man had died in fire set by defendant and that
murder charges were pending); People v. Roman, 256 Cal. App. 2d 735, 64 Cal. Rptr. 268
(Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (withholding information of victim's death).
98 United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968). "We do
not find in that decision [Miranda] any intimation that knowledge of the punishment
for the crime with which he was charged is a prerequisite to a valid waiver of constitutional rights .. " Id. at 845.
99 Mont. ,445 P.2d 731 (1968).
445 P.2d at 736.
100 "I didn't cut or kill my husband. I swear I didn't." Id. at -,
101 Id. at ,445 P.2d at 736. "We are not aware of any requirement that an in-custody
suspect, prior to interrogation by law enforcement officers, must be advised with technical
precision of a charge not then filed and the penalty upon conviction." Id.
102 293 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mont. 1968).
03 Id. at 29.
104 "Since Schenk was not advised as to the reason for his detention and questioning,
we hold that his waiver was not made knowingly and intelligently." Id. The Schenk
court could have found that the defendant did in fact know without an admonition that
he was being questioned for the murder of his wife since she died in the defendant's
home before police arrived "as a result of a gunshot wound in the neck inflicted at point
blank range." Id. at 27. The court noted, however, that the defendant's later query of an
interrogating county attorney whether he thought he needed an attorney cast "extreme
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suspect cannot intelligently make the decision as to whether he wants
counsel if knowledge of the crime suspected is withheld from him.
This knowledge is a necessity for the free exercise of the right to
counsel."' 05
Since Miranda specifically requires only four warnings, it could be
argued that the Court contemplated that no further warnings were
necessary to protect the privilege of silence during custodial interrogation. Nevertheless, the Schenk decision is in accord with the Supreme
Court's rationale for warning a suspect that his statements may be
used in evidence against him. 10 6 In Johnsonv. New Jersey107 the court
explained that Mirandawas "designed in part to assure that the person
who responds to interrogation while in custody does so with intelligent
understanding of his right to remain silent and of the consequences
which may flow from relinquishing it."108 Unless a suspect is aware

of the nature and seriousness of the crime for which he is interrogated,
he cannot understand intelligently the consequences which may flow
from relinquishing his Mirandarights. The defendant at trial must be
informed of the charges against him and the possible range of punishments before he can waive his right to counsel.10 9 The Court's repeated reference to the functional equivalence of trial and pre-trial
questioning" suggests that police must provide an in-custody suspect
with similar information prior to interrogation.
It may not be possible in all cases for interrogators to give notice of
the technical charge which will be filed against a suspect."' When
such information is not known, the police should at least inform the
suspect of the nature and seriousness of the crime they are investigating. Requiring interrogators to give this warning would prevent
police misrepresentation of the gravity of the charge and would simplify the reviewing court's difficult inquiry to determine if the suspect
has "knowingly" waived his right to remain silent.
doubt as to Schenk's understanding of the circumstances of his detention and interrogation."
Id. at 28. "As matters stood, Schenk was very likely misled, wittingly or unwittingly, by the
county attorney in regard to why he was being detained and questioned." Id. (emphasis
added).
'05 Id. at 29.

100 "This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but
also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of
the privilege." 384 U.S. 436, at 469.
107 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
108 Id. at 729-30.
109 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-4 (1948).

110 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
111 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kern v. Maroney, 275 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1967),
where the police did not know what the ultimate charges against the accused would be.
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C. Multiple InterrogationSessions
The common police practice of conducting interrogation "sessions"
interspersed with periods of confinement raises two further issues that
are closely related to the employment of deceptive interrogation tactics
and the necessity for police to provide a suspect with more information than the initial warnings. Police interrogators sometimes resort
to multiple sessions when new information is discovered after an initial
session or when it appears likely that alternating periods of interrogation and confinement will erode a suspect's powers of resistance. Some
lower courts have considered whether the Miranda waiver rules require police interrogators to repeat the initial admonition of rights
before all subsequent sessions. A few courts have confronted the separate problem of determining whether and under what conditions
interrogation may be resumed by the police after an initial interrogation is terminated by a suspect's claim of the right to silence, unaccompanied by a specific request for counsel.
1. The Need for Repeated Warnings. Several lower courts have
held that if the Miranda warnings are administered at an initial
interrogation session, the police need not repeat the warnings prior
to each subsequent session, 112 even when the sessions are days apart." 3
These decisions usually rest on the ground that "to adopt an automatic
second warning system would be to add a perfunctory ritual to police
practices rather than providing the meaningful set of procedural safe'4
guards envisioned by Miranda.""
The "perfunctory ritual" rationale is not without its difficulties. In
some situations the gains from a second warning system may greatly
outweigh whatever losses ensue from the "ritual" of repeated warnings and waiver. Additional warnings become increasingly necessary
as the time between the initial warnings and the subsequent interrogation session increases.-" Initial warnings will rarely be sufficient to
112 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1968); Tucker v. United
States, 375 F.2d 365 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967); People v. Hill, 39 Ill.
2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367 (1968).
113 See, e.g., Maguire v. United States, 396 F-2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968) (warnings 3 days
earlier held sufficient); State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 245 A.2d 339 (1968) (warnings 2V days
earlier held sufficient).
2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367, 371 (1968).
114 People v. Hill, 39 Ill.
115 Conversely, repeated warnings may not be necessary when a subsequent interrogation session is conducted only a day after an initial warning. See Sossamon v. State, 432 S.W.2d 469 (1968) (repetition of Miranda warnings held unnecessary where
Ark. -,
the second interrogation followed the first by one day); People v. Sievers, 255 Cal. App. 2d
34, 62 Cal. Rptr. 841 (Ct. App. 1967) (renewed warnings held unnecessary where second
interrogation occurred the day after the initial interrogation, which was preceded by
adequate warnings).
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overcome the pressures of police interrogations which occur several
days later, possibly with different questioners and in a different
setting." 6 Miranda specifically states that the required warnings are
designed not only to advise the suspect of his rights, but also to ensure
that he is aware of his interrogator's willingness to recognize his
rights should he choose to exercise them."" If the right to terminate
questioning at any time after interrogation has begun is to be a meaningful choice for a suspect, he should have a continuing awareness of
his rights and of his interrogator's willingness to respect his rights.
Without repeated warnings of rights and renewed offers of the opporunity to exercise them, police may exploit an initial waiver by obtaining information from a suspect, conducting further investigations,
and then returning to confront the suspect with new evidence and a
more searching interrogation, without affording him a genuine opportunity to exercise his rights."18
2. The Effects of an Initial Claim of Rights or Termination of Interrogation on a Subsequent Waiver. Frequently, a suspect will claim
his rights or cut off questioning at an initial interrogation, only to
make an apparently valid waiver and subsequent statement at some
later time. 1 9 Miranda provides slight guidance for lower courts attempting to assess the validity of the ultimate waiver. Under Miranda
if a suspect in custody asks for a lawyer, "the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an
opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning."' 20 The Court was less clear about
an initial claim of the privilege or termination of interrogation unaccompanied by a specific request for counsel. If the suspect indicates
"in any manner" at any time during the interrogation that he wishes
to remain silent, Miranda directs the police to stop questioning him.12'
The Court did not indicate, however, whether the presence of counsel
is necessary if the police resume interrogation, or whether a higher
116 See Charles v. State, 424 S.W.2d 909, 916 (rex. Ct. Grim. App. 1967) (Onion, J., dissenting).
117 384 U.S. at 468.
118 It should be noted that repeated warnings are not demanded by the Supreme Court's
guideline that a suspect's statement should "closely follow" a waiver of rights. 384 U.S. at
475. Subject to the malleable prohibition against "lengthy interrogation," it would seem
permissible for police under the present rules to administer an initial warning of rights,
interrogate the suspect at later sessions without giving any warnings, and then obtain
a waiver "closely followed" by a confession.
119 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 398 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1968).
120 384 U.S. at 474.
121 Id. at 473-4.
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standard of waiver is required for the admissibility of any subsequent
statement.
The California Supreme Court has held that the presence of counsel
at subsequent interrogations is automatically invoked by a claim of
the right to silence. In People v. Fioritto122 the accused refused to sign
a written waiver form after being admonished of his Miranda rights.
Police interrogators later confronted him with two juvenile accomplices
who had confessed and implicated him in a burglary, and repeated the
Miranda warnings, inquiring anew whether Fioritto would like to
sign the waiver and confess. The California Supreme Court, refusing
to uphold the ensuing waiver, excluded Fioritto's subsequent confession from evidence. Emphasizing that its decision furthered the goal
of providing concrete rules that would "liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in
each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had
been employed to secure admissions or confession,'

2 3

the court made

it clear that police may not initiate renewed interrogation after a
suspect's claim of the right to silence if counsel is not present.124
The California rule furthers the policy against interrogating a suspect against his will 12 5 -a concern implicit in Miranda's holding that
questioning must be stopped whenever the suspect so requests-but
Fiorittoappears to represent a minority position. A lack of enthusiasm
for the policies underlying Miranda seems to be reflected in the holding of several courts that a claim of the right to silence, of itself, does
122 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
123 Id. at 717, 441 P.2d at 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
124 "By his refusal to waive his constitutional rights initially, defendant indicated that
he intended to assert his rights-the privilege had been once invoked-and all further
attempts at police interrogation should have ceased. Although the confrontation of defendant with his two juvenile accomplices who had confessed injected a new factor into the
questioning, the didactic language of the United States Supreme Court shows no disposition
to permit subsequent interrogation in the absence of counsel even if authorities believe
there has been a change of circumstances. Thus we have no alternative but to hold that
the confession thereafter secured constituted inadmissible evidence at trial." Id. at 719,
Cal. App. 2d 441 P.2d at 627, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 819; see People v. Hamilton, 74 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1968).
125 The Fioritto court carefully excluded from its holding those cases in which renewed
questioning is initiated by the suspect. See id. at 719, 441 P.2d at 628, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
,66 Cal.
Cal. App. 2d Although an earlier California decision, People v. Tomita, Rptr. 739 (Ct. App. 1968), seemed to suggest that lower standards for waiver would apply
to interrogations initiated by a suspect after an initial claim of rights, the California courts
have not adopted this analysis. At present the California courts dealing with suspect-initiated
interrogations distinguish between "passive" or "neutral" police questioning, which is permissible without a sh6wing of waiver, from more active police questioning, which must be
preceded by an effective waiver of Miranda rights. See, e.g., People v. Matthews, 264 Cal.
App. 2d 630, -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 756, 764 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. Ireland, 264 Cal. App.
2d 319, -. 70 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386 (Ct. App. 1968).
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not automatically invoke a suspect's right to the presence of counsel at
subsequent interrogations. 1 26 Similarly, other courts have held that a
termination of questioning by a suspect who does not specifically request counsel does not bar all further questioning initiated by police
in the absence of counsel, but merely requires the police to postpone
27
questioning for a "reasonable length of time.'
Even when police initiate renewed interrogation on the same day
that the suspect has terminated questioning by claiming his right to
silence, the lower courts have sometimes upheld the validity of the
ultimate waiver. In Jennings v. United States 28 the defendant was

taken to a local police station after being arrested for transporting a
stolen car in interstate commerce. The accused, who apparently waived
his rights orally after receiving the Miranda warnings, answered a few
questions too rapidly for a local interrogating officer to write down his
responses, and then terminated the interrogation by claiming his right
to silence. In less than an hour an FBI agent arrived at the police
station and resumed the interrogation after repeating the warnings.
At the second interrogation session, the accused signed a written
waiver form and gave a signed, written statement that implicated him
in the crime, despite its apparently exculpatory tone. The Fifth Circuit, noting that the FBI agent was unaware of the suspect's earlier
claim of the right to silence, upheld the waiver and affirmed the conviction. The court emphasized that adequate warnings preceded both
interrogations and that Jennings "found out that immediately upon
expressing an unwillingness to proceed the interrogation would
promptly stop.'

29

It would seem, however, that the suspect found by

"claiming" his rights that he could not terminate interrogation but
could only postpone police questioning for a short time. The result
in Jennings disregards the fact that Miranda's procedural safeguards
were clearly intended to accomplish purposes beyond the proscription
of intentional police abuses, and ignores the Supreme Court's concern
with the impact of questioning on the accused.

126 See, e.g., State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438, cert. denied, 392 US. 937

(1968).
127 See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968) (interrogation resumed
the next day). Accord: the Miranda dissent of Justice Clark, 384 U.S. at 500.
128 391 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968). See also People v. Lewis, 262 Cal. App. 2d 622, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1968), where the suspect's waiver was apparently upheld on the grounds that
the police interrogator obtaining the waiver was unaware that the suspect had claimed
his right to counsel at an earlier interrogation the day before. The Lewis decision, which
preceded and appears to have been overruled by the California Supreme Court's decision
in People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 753, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968), would seem
to be in direct conflict with the mandates of the Miranda Court. See 384 US. at 474.
129 391 F.2d at 516.
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It could be argued that the decisions permitting a resumption of
interrogation in the absence of counsel after a suspect's claim of the
right to silence are not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's goal of
promoting a "free and informed" choice of whether or not to remain
silent and whether or not to request counsel. Some suspects terminating interrogation may desire neither representation by counsel nor a
complete cessation of questioning. The state's interest in interrogation
as a means of detecting the guilty, the argument would proceed, demands that this possibility not be foreclosed in the absence of more
concrete indications of the suspect's intentions at the time he asserts
his rights.
This argument seems tenuous, at best. In most cases, permitting a
resumption of interrogation in the absence of counsel sanctions interrogating a suspect against his will, a practice which may be offensive
in itself.13 0 Even interrogations resumed after a "reasonable length of
time" may have the coercive effect of wearing down a suspect's powers
of resistance and browbeating him into a waiver. 13 The Supreme
Court's directives in Miranda do not specifically require a prophylactic rule like that adopted by the California Supreme Court, but the
Court's concern with protecting the suspect from involuntary questioning and the inherent dangers of coercion in such questioning
strongly imply that higher standards for waiver should apply when renewed interrogation is initiated by the police.
A recent decision of the United States District Court for Montana,
United States v. Bird,3 2 indicates that a suspect's initial claim of the
right to silence may impose higher standards for a subsequent waiver.
The suspect in Bird terminated questioning by local officers by stating
that she did not want to "talk anymore." She was then questioned "as
a witness" by an FBI agent who did not know of her prior claim of
rights. After receiving renewed warnings, the suspect refused to sign
a written waiver form presented by the agent. However, when the
130 One of the fundamental policies underlying the privilege is the concern to guard
against indiscriminate and unwarranted police interference with individual privacy by
guaranteeing a "right to a private enclave" where an individual may "lead a private life."
See 384 U.S. at 460. Thus in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 882 U.S. 406, 414-16
(1966), the Court emphasized the role of the privilege in protecting the "right ... to be
let alone."
131 One court allowing resumption of questioning in the absence of counsel after a
"reasonable time" conceded in dictum that the right to terminate questioning appears to
bar any waiver obtained by police who return a suspect to his cell after an initial claim
of the right to silence and then periodically bring him out to ask him for a waiver,
repeating the process until one is obtained. State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 456, 155 N.W.2d
438, 441, cert. denied, 892 S. 937 (1968).
132 4 Crim. L. Rep. 2803 (D. Mont. 1968).
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agent asked her if she wanted to talk without an attorney anyway, she
agreed. The court assumed that the suspect's statements were not
barred solely by her initial claim of the right to silence, but held that
the prosecution failed to carry its "heavy burden" of proof to establish
a waiver in view of the suspect's earlier refusal to speak. 33
Few decisions, however, have imposed a higher standard for waiver
after an initial claim of the right to silence. Several courts have held
that it is permissible for police interrogators to inform the suspect
truthfully of new circumstances which may induce a waiver and
statement in the absence of counsel. 3 4 The rule emerging from
these decisions is consistent with a policy of promoting an informed
choice on the part of the suspect, but it appears to increase the danger
that police interrogators will attempt to pry a waiver from an unwilling
or vacillating suspect by screening the information that reaches him or
by exaggerating the significance of new information. Even in the absence of deliberate police distortion, the suspect, unaided by counsel,
will usually lack the requisite background to evaluate the significance
of the facts imparted to him by the police.
The flexible approach of United States v. Bird may be a desirable
way of reviewing these "new information" cases. Unlike the prophylactic rule of Fioritto,this approach does not have the disadvantage of
frustrating good faith police interrogation as well as misleading and
abusive tactics. The California rule prohibiting all interrogation in
the absence of counsel, even when the police have new information to
impart to the suspect, seems incongruous if the police are free to
confront the suspect with any evidence against him prior to a claim
of the right to silence. However, the danger of coercion in renewing
interrogation after a suspect has claimed his right to silence or in confronting him with new evidence after he has been in confinement
suggests that a higher standard for waiver should prevail when the
police induce a suspect to "change his mind" and waive his rights.
133 Several additional circumstances supported the result in Bird. After the suspect
refused to sign a written waiver form, the agent's question as to whether she would like

to talk without a lawyer anyway seems to have been designed to extract a waiver by minimizing its significance. In addition, the suspect had special weaknesses which might have
impaired her ability to resist coercion. She was an Indian with an eighth grade education
who was described as "drunk" at 1:00 AM on the morning of the interrogation. The interrogation was conducted thirteen miles from her home; apparently, she had no sleep prior
to the first session, which began at 7:00 AM. She testified at trial that she "thought maybe
I had to" let the police question her.
134 See, e.g., State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N.W.2d 438, cert. denied, 392 U.S.
937 (1968); State v. Vangen, - Wash. 2d -, 433 P.2d 691 (1967). But see People v.
Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 753, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
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D. The Suspect's Powers of Resistance
The waiver issues raised in the preceding sedtions come sharply
into focus when police seek waivers from suspects whose personal
weaknesses render them especially susceptible to manipulation or intimidation. 13 5 Such individuals, who most need the safeguard of counsel's
presence, are the very persons most likely to waive their rights.
Courts assessing the validity of a waiver often seem to utilize the traditional "voluntariness" approach of weighing "the circumstances of
pressure against the powers of resistance of the person confessing.
What would be overpowering to the weak of will might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal."' 30 The courts have continued to weigh the particular suspect's intelligence, education, and
emotional stability, but the Miranda waiver rules provide little guidance for determining the emphasis which should now be given to these
circumstances. While the criminal background of a suspect continues
to be probative of increased powers of resistance to police trickery and
intimidation, 13' 7 Miranda apparently has not yet altered the rule that
youth alone does not render a confession inadmissible.5 8 Similarly,
Mirandaseems to have had little effect on the traditional rule that intoxication will not render a confession inadmissible unless the suspect's
drunken condition amounts to "mania. u 38a In addition, some courts
135 The Court in Miranda evinced a particular concern to safeguard the legal rights of
such suspects. "The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for example, in
Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed individual with
pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an indigent Los
Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade." 384 U.S. at 457.
136 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953) (Jackson, J.).
37 See, e.g., State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 245 A.2d 339 (1968) (accused's experience with
criminal and civil courts and processes demonstrated that his waiver of counsel was a
deliberate and understanding choice); State v. Collins, - Wash. 2d -, 446 P.2d 325 (1968)
(accused's criminal record of six felony convictions was evidence that he had not been
deceived by an interrogating officer's alleged assurance that their conversation was "strictly
off the record'); State v. Vangen, - Wash. 2d -, 433 P.2d 691 (1967) (accused's criminal
background indicated that his waiver and confession were not the result of his illegal
arrest and detention).
138 See, e.g., Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968) (18); West v. United
States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968) (16); People v. Hill, 39 Ill.
2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 867, cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (17); People v. Watts, - Ill. App. 2d -, 241 N.E.2d 463 (1968)
(20); Miller v. State, - Md. App. -, 247 A.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1968) (16); State v. Wiggins,
4 Md. App. 95, 241 A.2d 424 (1968) (15). One commentator predicted that under Miranda
no waiver from a "juvenile" under 16 (as opposed to a "youth" between 16 and 21) could
conceivably be found unless counsel or a parent was present during the interrogation.
N. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS-MIRANDA v. ARIZONA 11 (1966).
138a See State v. Manuel, - La. -, 217 So. 2d 369, 371 (1968), where the Louisiana Supreme Court found an "intelligent" waiver by a suspect who claimed he was drugged,
stating that "[t]o render a confession inadmissible, drug or alcohol intoxication must be
of such a degree as to negate the defendant's comprehension and render him unconscious

1969]

Waiver of Miranda Rights

continue to hold that a confession will not be barred simply because
the suspect is severely and obviously emotionally upset during interrogation. 1 8sb Thus, after the Miranda warnings have been administered,
many lower courts seem to apply old standards of "voluntariness" to
weigh the significance of personal weaknesses of the suspect.
The principal impact of the Mirandawaiver rules on the traditional
standards for evaluating the personal characteristics of a suspect
stems from the Court's mandate that a waiver be "intelligently" made.
The concept of an "intelligent" waiver, however, is paradoxical. In
People v. Lux' 39 a New York court noted that the unanimous opinion
of criminal lawyers is that "a client being interrogated [should] refuse
to waive anything pending a dispassionate evaluation of the strength
of the enemy. If an intelligent specialist would so advise, then anyone
who does waive is presumably acting unintelligently."1 40 Rather than
eliminate all possibility of waiver, the New York court decided that
the concept of an intelligent waiver in the absence of an attorney is
an "amiable fiction." Focusing its inquiry on the intelligence of the
individual waiving the right rather than the intelligence of the waiver
decision itself, the New York court concluded that the requisite intelligence required by Miranda is "the intelligence demonstrated to a
14
reasonable degree by that panacea of the law-the reasonable man." '

The New York court's reasonable man test appears to permit waivers
made with less than full appreciation of the tactical advantages that
may be gained by silence at interrogation-such as bargaining for a
reduced sentence or lesser charges in return for a guilty plea. This
seems consistent with the fact that Miranda does not require the
actual presence of counsel at interrogation. At the same time, a reasonable man test would exclude waivers made by suspects with diminished
intelligence or marked psychological weaknesses. For such suspects it
is extremely unlikely that a warning of rights can provide "assurance
of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege of silence" or overcome the compulsions of the interrogation atmosphere.
of what he is saying. If a defendant understands the statements directed to him and
knows what he is saying, the confession is admissible."
Other courts seem more reluctant to specify standards. See State v. Fisk, - Idaho -, 448
P.2d 768 (1968), where the Idaho Supreme Court simply affirmed the trial court's ruling
that "although defendant had been drinking, he was sober enough to, and did, voluntarily,
intelligently and knowingly waive" his Miranda rights. A blood test established that at
the time of his waiver and confession the defendant had an alcohol blood content sufficient
to establish a presumption of drunkenness under the Idaho drunk driving statute.
138b See, e.g., Estes v. State, - Ga. -, 164 SE.2d 108 (1968).
139 56 Misc. 2d 561, 289 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Suffolk County Ct. 1967).
140 Id. at 563, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
141 Id. at 564, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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Thus the Lux court found that while the defendant's waiver was made
knowingly and willingly, it was not made "intelligently" because the
suspect had "a low level of understanding of semantics" and "an unusual psychological desire to give pleasing answers to his interrogators,"
and had been in police custody for three to three and one-half hours
142
before confessing.
Most lower courts, like the New York court, have inquired into
the intelligence of the individual rather than the intelligence of his
waiver, but the courts have differed considerably as to the requisite
intelligence required by Mirandafor a valid waiver. In People v. Randolph,143 a New York court employed the Lux reasonable man test to
invalidate a waiver by a practically illiterate suspect who had an I.Q.
of 68 and less than a sixth grade education. In Elrod v. State, 144 on the
other hand, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a waiver of Miranda
rights by an apparently feebleminded illiterate with a second grade
education, whose testimony revealed that he had never heard of the
United States Constitution. 145 The Randolph decision interpreted the
test of an "intelligent" waiver to require a full understanding not
only of the warnings but also of the consequences of foregoing one's
rights. 46 In State v. McKnight,147 however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated that a suspect must understand only that he has the right
to remain silent and that a waiver is no less "voluntary, knowing and
intelligent" if he misunderstands the meaning of the Miranda warnings, as by failing to appreciate that oral as well as written statements
14
can be admitted in evidence against him. 8

These cases illustrate the elasticity of Miranda'srequirement of an
"intelligent" waiver. But some of the lower court decisions seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of the function the required warnings are to serve. It is unlikely that the suspect in Elrod
was capable of appreciating the warnings sufficiently to make informed
decisions to remain silent and to request counsel. The rule announced
142 Id.

143 -

Misc. 2d -,

294 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Genessee County Ct. 1968).

144 231 Ala. 331, 202 So. 2d 539 (1967).
145 Compare the remark of one commentator, "[t]hus illiteracy, feeblemindedness or a
history of mental illness, if externally established, will never support a finding of either
understanding of the warning or intelligent waiver." N. SOBr.L, THE NEW CONFESSION
STANDARDS-MMANDA

V. ARIZONA 13 (1966).

146 - Misc. 2d at -, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 936. See People v. Dumas, 51 Misc. 2d 929, 274
N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
147 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968).
148 Id. at- , 243 A.2d at 251. See id. at -, 243 A.2d at 250-1: "[lt is consonant with good
morals and the Constitution, to exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity in the detectional
process."
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in McKnight appears to be a more forthright emasculation of Miranda.
One of the minimum purposes of the required warnings was to ensure
that a suspect is made aware of the consequences of foregoing his right
to silence, at least to the extent that he appreciates that his statements
can be used in evidence against him. 149 Although full knowledge of
the consequences of relinquishing the right to silence may be impossible in the absence of counsel, a minimum requisite to any "knowing"
waiver would seem to be an awareness by the suspect that his oral
statements are just as binding as those in writing.
The reluctance of the McKnight and Elrod courts to inquire into the
suspect's understanding of his Mirandarights may be caused in part by
the difficulties of determining a suspect's mental capacity to waive his
rights. As under the "voluntariness" standard, many post-Miranda
courts have inquired into the psychological responses of the particular
suspect to police pressures during detention and interrogation. Some
decisions have attempted to lessen the difficulties of this inquiry' 50
by emphasizing the visible outward appearances of the suspect and
the knowledge of police interrogators of the suspect's mental condition
at the time a waiver and confession were made. In People v. Golwitzer,151 a New York court emphasized that indications of the defendant's mental condition and background were known to police at the
time of interrogation, and refused to uphold an express oral waiver by
a suspect with a history of emotional instability. A similar approach
was employed in State v. Bower 5 2 to affirm a conviction over the appellant's contention that at the time of his waiver he was suffering
from a narcotic hangover which rendered him temporarily mentally
incompetent. The court stressed the testimony of police interrogators
that the suspect appeared normal, physically and emotionally, and
149 "It is only' through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege." 384 US. at 469.
150 One recent survey of the social science literature states that a suspect's capacity to
resist coercive influences in custodial police interrogation is strengthened by self-confidence,
self-assertiveness, prior exposure to interrogations, and a "high need for achievement and
an orientation of attention primarily toward the content of what is perceived rather than
toward its source (persons)." Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion,
82 HARv. L. REv. 42, 48-9. "Low status persons-those who have never enjoyed a secure
or rewarding social position-are likely to be the most vulnerable of all to indoctrination,
and persons with 'strong unconscious, self-punitive tendencies ... not only (tend) to confess
more easily but even to confess to crimes never actually committed.'" Id. at 48. Although
a suspect's social status and prior criminality may be readily established at trial, formidable
problems of proof would have to be overcome to establish the suspect's psychological
characteristics.
151 52 Misc. 2d 925, 277 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Erie County Ct. 1966).
152 - Wash. 2d -, 440 P-2d 167 (1968).
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that they had noticed nothing to indicate that he was under the in-

1 53
fluence of drugs at the time of confession.

By emphasizing the suspect's visible outward appearances the Golwitzer and Bower courts avoided the practical difficulties inherent in
any direct attempt to ascertain the suspect's actual state of mind at the
time of a challenged waiver of rights. These difficulties may be particularly acute in cases like Bower where the suspect claims that his
mental facilities were only temporarily impaired. In such cases a test
which seeks to ascertain the suspect's actual state of mind at the time
of a waiver would of necessity depend solely on the testimony of the
accused, since he alone is in a position to testify as to his actual state
of mind. The dangers of perjured or distorted testimony attaching to
such a test might be prohibitively high. On the other hand, reliance
upon visible outward appearances minimizes the Miranda Court's
concern for the impact of custodial questioning on the accused. A test
emphasizing the visible indication of a suspect's mental state appears
to deter the deliberate exploitation by police of obviously incompetent
suspects, but paradoxically such a test is almost totally dependent upon
police testimony. A court attaching importance to outward appearances
might illogically admit waivers by suspects who appear normal but
who in fact do not have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid
waiver, while excluding waivers by suspects whose mental capacity is
visibly impaired at the time of confession, but who in fact have sufficient mental presence to effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
waiver. 154
Judicial inquiry into a suspect's actual mental capacity seems to be
an unavoidable necessity, since many suspects are particularly susceptible to manipulation. The difficulties courts experience when attempting to ascertain a suspect's understanding of his Miranda rights
and his willingness to waive those rights can be substantially reduced,
153 Id. at -,

440 P.2d at 173.
154 See Note, Intoxicated Confessions: A New Haven in Miranda?, 20 STAN. L. Rrv. 1269
(1968), for a discussion of some of the problems inherent in "objective" and "subjective"
tests of a suspect's mental capacity.
The search for easily administered criteria by which to gauge the suspect's state of mind
at the time of the challenged waiver is illustrated by the recent Montana case, State v.
Lucero, - Mont. -, 445 P.2d 731 (1968). In Lucero, interrogating officers testified at trial
that the defendant at the time of her arrest was "under the influence" of alcohol and
"didn't seem to be aware of the happenings," but that she "regained her composure" prior
to later warnings and questioning. The defendant testified that she did not remember
being given the Miranda warnings or waiving her rights, nor did she remember the subsequent questioning and statement. Affirming the conviction, the Montana Supreme Court
stressed that the content of the defendant's apparently exculpatory statement indicated that
"her mental facilities were operating in high gear at the time of the interrogation." Id.
at -, 445 P.2d at 737.
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however, by requiring the police to take reasonable precautions to ensure that a waiver is "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" made.
Explaining the meaning and significance of the Miranda warnings
and waiver, repeating the warnings at widely separated interrogation
sessions, notifying the suspect of the crime he is suspected of having
committed, and obtaining an express waiver of rights before any interrogation should compensate for the low mental capacity of many suspects. As the foregoing cases illustrate, many lower courts do not require these precautions to be taken before a waiver can be obtained
from suspects with particular deficiencies. In the absence of more
specific Supreme Court mandates the lower courts retain considerable
autonomy in assessing the significance of a suspect's personal weaknesses.
It appears that many courts have concluded that the suspect's powers
of resistance should be given no more consideration than under the
traditional voluntary-confessions standard.
III. CONCLUSION

If by your art, my dearest father, you have
Put the wild waters in this roar, allay them. 155
MIRANDA.

Miranda was prompted in part by the conflicting lower court confession standards which emerged in response to Escobedo v. Illinois.
But the ambiguities of Miranda,like those of Escobedo before it, have
resulted in uneven implementation of the Supreme Court's goals in
the lower courts. Many courts, perhaps because of their hostility to
limitations on police interrogations, have managed to equate the
Court's requirement of a "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" waiver
with the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test. These courts have assessed
the totality of circumstances surrounding a waiver in much the same
way they traditionally weighed the circumstances surrounding the confession itself. They have paid little heed to the Supreme Court's requirement that a waiver be "knowing and intelligent" as well as
"voluntary." In many jurisdictions the Court's new confession standards have been interpreted to require little more than an incantation
of four-fold warnings by the police; the degree of free choice required
for the admissibility of statements made during interrogation has been
little changed. If the Court intended to establish more stringent standards for the admissibility of confessions, and if Miranda's approach
to the confessions dilemma is to be retained, more explicit waiver
guidelines are needed.
155 W. Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act I, sc. ii, lines 1-2.

